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Abstract: Emergence and re-emergence of pathogens are notoriously difficult to predict. The 20 erratic nature of those events is reinforced by the stochastic nature of pathogen evolution dur-21 ing the early phase of an epidemic. For instance, mutations allowing pathogens to escape host 22 resistance may boost pathogen spread and promote emergence. Yet, the ecological factors 23 that govern such evolutionary emergence remain elusive both because of the lack of ecological 24 realism of current theoretical frameworks and the difficulty of experimentally testing their pre-25 dictions. Here we develop a theoretical model to explore the effects of the heterogeneity of the 26 host population on the probability of pathogen emergence, with or without pathogen evolution. 27
We show that evolutionary emergence and the spread of escape mutations in the pathogen 28 population is more likely to occur when the host population contains an intermediate proportion 29
of resistant hosts. We also show that lower pathogen inoculum size and higher diversity of host 30 resistance decrease the probability of evolutionary emergence. Crucially, we present experi-31 mental confirmations of these predictions using lytic bacteriophages infecting their bacterial 32 hosts containing diverse CRISPR-Cas immune defenses. We discuss the implications of these 33 results for cross-species spillover and for the management of emerging infectious diseases. 34
Significance statement: Can we predict the emergence of infectious diseases? The proba-35 bility that an epidemic breaks out is highly dependent on the ability of the pathogen to acquire 36 new adaptive mutations and to induce evolutionary emergence. Forecasting pathogen emer-37 gence thus requires a good understanding of the interplay between epidemiology and evolution 38 taking place at the onset of an outbreak. Here, we provide a comprehensive theoretical frame-39 work to analyze the impact of host population heterogeneity on the probability of pathogen 40 evolutionary emergence. We use this model to predict the impact of the fraction of susceptible 41 hosts, the inoculum size of the pathogen and the diversity of host resistance on pathogen 42 Introduction 46
The emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases is a major public-health concern. 47 Understanding the factors that govern the ability of pathogens to invade a new host population 48 is of paramount importance to design better surveillance systems and control policies. Mathe-49 matical epidemiology can provide key insights into these dynamics (1) (2) (3) (4) . For instance, simple 50 deterministic models identified critical vaccination thresholds above which pathogens are 51 driven extinct, which informed policy guidelines for vaccination campaigns (1) . However, 52 chance events and rapid pathogen evolution can also play a critical role in determining the 53 outcome of disease dynamics (5, 3, 2). For example, recent experimental studies indicate that 54 the dramatic size of the 2013-2016 Ebola epidemic can at least be partially explained by the 55 acquisition of genetic mutations that increased transmissibility to humans (6, 7). 56
Stochastic models of epidemiology can help to understand the emergence of evolving 57 pathogen populations (5, 8-12). Available models, however, often make the unrealistic as-58 sumption that the pathogen is spreading in a well-mixed and homogeneous host population 59 where all hosts are equally susceptible. Here we develop a general multi-host model to analyze 60 the probability of evolutionary emergence of a pathogen in heterogeneous host populations 61
where only some hosts are resistant to the pathogen. We demonstrate that realistic increases 62 in the diversity of host resistance alleles strongly reduce the probability of evolutionary emer-63 gence of novel pathogens, hence suggesting new strategies to manage the emergence of 64 diseases. Crucially, we developed a new experimental system using bacteria with distinct 65 CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat) immunity and their lytic 66 viruses (bacteriophages) (13-16) to explore the effect of host population heterogeneity on the 67 emergence and evolution of pathogens. The experimental validation of our theoretical predic-68 tions with this microbial system confirms the ability of our mathematical model to capture the 69 complexity of the interplay between the epidemiology and evolution of emerging pathogens. 70
71

Results
72
Theory: predicting the probability of pathogen emergence 73 In order to predict how the composition of host populations impacts the probability of pathogen 74 emergence, we developed a branching process model (5, (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . In this model, we assume 75 that the host population contains a fraction 1 − of individuals that are fully susceptible to 76 the pathogen while the remaining fraction of the population is resistant and composed of a 77 mixture of host types in equal frequencies, each of which has a different resistance allele. 78
The efficacy of resistance is governed by the parameter . When = 1, resistance is perfect 79 and hosts can only be infected by pathogens that carry an escape mutation (one of which is 80 available for each host resistance allele). When < 1 host resistance is imperfect and 1 − 81 measures the probability that a pathogen can cause an infection without the required escape 82 mutation. Therefore, a pathogen with escape mutations ( between 0 and ) can infect a 83 fraction 1 − + + of the total host population. 84
We further assume that a host infected with a pathogen that does not carry escape 85 mutations transmits at rate and dies at rate . Host resistance prevents infection without 86 affecting or . Whereas escape mutations allow the pathogen to infect a larger fraction of the 87 host population, they also carry a fitness cost which causes pathogens with escape muta-88 tions to reproduce at rate = 1 − . The probability of acquiring an escape mutation is a 89 function of , the number of resistance alleles in the population, as well as the number of 90 escape mutations already encoded by the pathogen. The probability that a pathogen with 91 escape mutations acquires an additional one equals , = − − ⁄ , where is the 92 pathogen mutation rate per base pair, and is its genome size. This simplifies to , ≈ 93 − ⁄ when the pathogen genome is considerably larger than the number of escape mu-94 tations (i.e. ≫ ). For the sake of simplicity, escape mutations cannot revert to the ancestral 95 types. To approximate the effect of spatial structure we assume that when a parasite is re-96 leased from an infected host it will land with probability on the same type of host (i.e. a 97 susceptible host when = 1), and with probability 1 − on a random host from the rest of 98 the population. 99
The expected number of secondary infections caused by a pathogen with escape 100 mutations in an uninfected host population is given by its basic reproduction ratio: 101
hosts that can be infected by the focal pathogen. A pathogen with escape mutations has a 103 basic reproduction ratio equal to , = 1 − , where = ⁄ refers to the basic repro-104 duction ratio of the unmutated pathogen in a fully susceptible host population. 105
The key question we wished to address with this model was how the composition and 106 structure of the host population determines the ultimate fate of a pathogen (i.e. extinction ver-107 sus emergence). We detail in the Supplementary Information the calculation of the 108 probability of emergence, , , which is the probability that an inoculum of pathogens with 109 escape mutations does not go extinct when introduced in a host population with different 110 resistance alleles. To understand the role of pathogen evolution in this process, we also derive 111 the probability of evolutionary emergence, which quantifies the importance of escape muta-112 tions to pathogen emergence. 113
Evolutionary emergence is maximized for intermediate proportions of resistant hosts 114
To understand how the composition of the host population determines the probability that a 115 pathogen can emerge, we consider the simple scenario where the population consists exclu-116 sively of sensitive hosts and one type of resistant hosts with the same resistance allele (i.e. 117 = 1). In this scenario, the probability of emergence of a phage with no escape mutation is 118 (see Supplementary Information) : 119
In the absence of mutation, the probability of pathogen emergence is thus: 121
Varying the fraction of resistant hosts shows that the probability of emergence decreases 122 linearly with the fraction of resistant hosts in well-mixed populations (when = 0 and = 1, 123 figure 1). As expected, the probability of emergence decreases with , the efficacy of host 124 resistance, and increases with , the size of the pathogen inoculum (figure 1). Population 125 structure has also a positive effect on pathogen emergence, since it helps the virus to persist 126 in the susceptible subpopulation. Interestingly, there is a threshold value for the fraction of 127 resistance where the probability of emergence vanishes (figure 1): 128
Next, we wanted to understand how pathogen evolution can help pathogens to emerge. 129
As expected, pathogen mutation generally increases the probability of emergence (unless 130 there is a significant fitness cost associated with escape mutations) because those mutations 131 allow escape from host resistance. The gray area in figure 1A measures the amount of evo-132 lutionary emergence. Interestingly, evolutionary emergence is maximized for intermediate 133 values of the frequency of resistance (usually when = , see figure 1B ). Indeed, when the 134 frequency of resistance is low there is no selection for escape mutations and those mutations 135 get rapidly lost if they are associated with fitness costs. In contrast, when the frequency of 136 resistance is high, the chains of transmission driven by the wild type strain are very short and 137 there is a lower rate of appearance of escape mutations. Hence, in spite of the strong selection 138 for escape mutations, the rate of evolutionary emergence is reduced. Intermediate resistance 139 frequency therefore maximizes evolutionary emergence because this is where both the influx 140 and the selection for escape mutations are high. When the efficacy of host resistance is low 141 and when the host population is spatially structured, the role of pathogen evolution is smaller, 142 simply because the probability of emergence without evolution is higher under these conditions 143 (see figures S1 and S2). 144
So far, the model considered only the role of pathogen mutation during the very early 145 stages of the epidemic, where stochastic effects play an important role. However, whenever 146 we observe the emergence of a novel pathogen, these initial stages will usually have already 147 passed, and pathogen evolution may therefore deviate from the patterns that are predicted by 148 the above model. For example, even when escape mutations are not necessary for emer-149 gence, those mutations may increase in frequency after the onset of an epidemic. This is 150 particularly true when the proportion of resistant hosts is large relative to the cost of mutation. 151
After emergence, the size of the pathogen population increases rapidly and one can start to 152 neglect the effect of demographic stochasticity on the change in escape mutation frequencies. 153
To understand how pathogens evolve over longer timescales during an epidemic (i.e. beyond 154 the initial emergence) we combined our stochastic description of pathogen emergence with a 155 deterministic model for the change in the frequency of escape mutations (see Supplementary  156 Information). This model predicts that the probability of observing an escape mutation evolv-157 ing in a pathogen population is maximized for a low frequency of host resistance (red dashed 158 curve in figure 1B and in figures S1, S2 and S3). 159
Diversity of host resistance decreases pathogen emergence 160
Natural host populations usually consist of multiple host genotypes, each carrying their own 161 resistance allele. To understand how this will impact the predicted patterns of pathogen emer-162 gence, we analyzed the situation where the resistant host population consists of types, at 163 equal frequencies and each carrying a unique resistance allele. In the absence of pathogen 164 mutations, emergence is governed by (3) and does not depend on host diversity because all 165 hosts are equally resistant to a pathogen with no escape mutations. Each extra escape mu-166 tation, however, allows the pathogen to infect a fraction 1 ⁄ of the resistant host population, 167 and the pathogen needs escape mutations to exploit the whole host population. Yet, the 168 probability , to acquire an escape mutation increases with because there are more genetic 169 loci involved in the interaction with the host. In other words, both the number of mutations 170 required to reach the top of the fitness landscape and the rate of acquisition of escape muta-171 tions increase with the diversity of host resistance. Because these two processes have 172 opposite effects on the rate of pathogen adaptation, it is not immediately obvious how host 173 diversity affects pathogen emergence. 174
We derive numerically the probability of pathogen emergence under a broad range of 175 scenarios (see Supplementary Information) . In figure 2 we show the joint effects of the fre-176 quency of resistance and the diversity of resistance. Increasing host diversity always 177 decreases the probability of emergence of the pathogen. We also find a very strong interaction 178 between host diversity and spatial structure. Because spatial structure induces a clustering of 179 the different types of resistant hosts it reduces the effective diversity of host resistance and 180 promotes pathogen emergence (figure S4). 181
The above analysis relies on (i) the assumption that the pathogen life-cycle can be 182 approximated by the birth-death model, and (ii) the assumption that the frequency of host re-183 sistance does not vary through time. We relaxed both these assumptions with individual based 184 simulations in the Supplementary Information and obtained very similar results (see figures 185 S5, S6 and S7). 186
Experiments on phage emergence confirm theoretical predictions 187
Next we wanted to explore experimentally the validity of the above predictions. While this is 188 challenging given the paucity of suitable empirical systems that are amenable to experimental 189 manipulations, we explored whether this could be achieved by studying the evolutionary emer-190 gence of "escape" phages against bacteria with CRISPR-based resistance. The mechanism 191 of CRISPR-based resistance relies on the addition of phage-derived sequences (known as 192 "spacers") in a CRISPR locus in the bacterial host genome (13). This empirical system allowed 193 us to overcome three important technical challenges. First, the stochastic nature of extinction 194 requires a large number of replicate populations to measure a probability of emergence, which 195 is possible using bacteria and phages. Second, by mixing bacteria with different and unique 196 CRISPR resistance alleles we could manipulate the fraction of resistant hosts and the diversity 197 in resistance alleles without affecting other traits of the host (17). Third, unlike most other em-198 pirical systems to study host-pathogen interactions, the genetic mechanism that enables the 199 pathogen (phage) to adapt to the host (bacterium) resistance through the acquisition of escape 200 mutations is well understood for CRISPR-phage interactions, where lytic phages "escape" 201 CRISPR resistance through mutation of the target sequence (the "protospacer") on the phage 202 genome (13, 15, 18, 19) . 203
In order to validate the model using this empirical system, we used 8 CRISPR-resistant 204 clones (also referred as Bacteriophage Insensitive Mutants, or "BIM") of the Gram-negative 205
Pseudomonas aeruginosa strain UCBPP-PA14, each of which carried one single spacer tar-206 geting the virulent phage DMS3vir. For each of these 8 CRISPR-resistant clones, the rate at 207 which the phage acquires escape mutations was found to be approximately equal to 2.8*10 -7 208 mutations/locus/replication, as determined using Luria-Delbruck experiments (see Supple-209 mentary Information and figure S8 ). Using these CRISPR-resistant clones, we first tested 210 the theoretical prediction that the probability of emergence increases with the size of the virus 211 inoculum ( ). To this end, 96 replicate populations, each composed of an equal mix of sensi-212 tive bacteria and a CRISPR-resistant clone, were each infected with on average 0.3, 3, 30, 213 300 or 3000 phages. After 24 hours, we measured the fraction of phage-infected bacterial 214 populations in which emergence had occurred. Consistent with the model predictions, we ob-215 served that the higher the phage inoculum size, the higher the probability of emergence ( figure  216 3, dashed line). In addition, we measured the fraction of populations where the phages had 217 evolved to escape CRISPR resistance. Again, in accordance with the theory, we found that 218 larger phage inoculi were associated with an increased evolution of phage escape mutations 219 (figure 3, full line, Kendall, z = 3.416, tau = 0.784, p < 0.001). Furthermore, we obtained very 220 similar results using a different empirical system consisting of the lytic phage 2972 and its 221
Gram-positive bacterial host Streptococcus thermophilus DGCC7710. In this experiment, 96 222 populations composed of sensitive and a CRISPR-resistant host were infected with either 2, 223 20 or 200 phages. As above, we found that a higher phage inoculum led to both a higher 224 probability of emergence and a higher probability of evolutionary emergence ( figure S9) . 225
Next, we tested the theoretical prediction that the probability of pathogen evolutionary 226 emergence is highest in populations with an intermediate fraction of resistant hosts ( figure 4) . 227
To this end, we generated populations composed of sensitive bacteria and a variable propor-228 tion of CRISPR-resistant bacteria, ranging from 0% to 100% in 10% increments. These 229 populations were subsequently infected with = 300 phages and the fraction of emergence 230 and evolutionary emergence were measured. As expected, pathogen/phage emergence 231 dropped when the proportion of host/bacteria resistance reached a certain threshold level (fig-232 ure S10). Interestingly, examination of phage evolution among emerging phage populations 233 also confirmed that the probability of observing escape mutations is maximized for intermedi-234 ate proportions of host resistance ( figure 4) . Again, we obtained very consistent results with 235 phage 2972 and S. thermophilus ( figure S9) . 236
We noticed substantial variation among CRISPR-resistant hosts in the observed fre-237 quencies of escape phage evolution ( figure 4) . Variations in phage mutation rates are unlikely 238 to explain this variability because, as pointed above, we failed to detect significant variations 239 in the rate of escape mutations to the different CRISPR-resistant hosts (see figure S8 ). Vari-240 ations in the fitness cost associated with these mutations could, however, explain the observed 241 variations in the final frequency of escape mutations (see figure S3 ). 242
Finally, we experimentally explored the effect of resistance allele diversity on evolution-243 ary emergence for a fixed proportion of host resistance ( = 0.5). To this end, we generated 244 bacterial populations that were composed of sensitive bacteria and an equal mix of 1, 2, 4 or 245 8 CRISPR-resistant clones. In this case, as expected, an inoculum size of 300 phages always 246 led to pathogen emergence, but increasing host diversity had a strong negative effect on the 247 ability of the phage to evolve to escape host resistance (figure 5). We also found higher prob-248 abilities of observing multiple escape mutations in the low diversity treatment (Kendall, z = -249 4.8771, Tau = -0.3259, p = 1.07*10 -6 ), which also supports the prediction that host diversity 250 hampers the evolution of the phage population. 251
Discussion
252
The emergence and re-emergence of pathogens has far-reaching negative impacts on wildlife, 253 agriculture and public health. Unfortunately, pathogen emergence events are notoriously diffi-254 cult to predict and we need good biological models to experimentally explore the interplay 255 between epidemiology and evolution taking place at the early stages of an epidemic. Here we 256 used a combination of diverse theoretical and experimental analyses to examine how the com-257 position of a host population impacts the probability of pathogen emergence and evolution. 258
Our experimental validation of these predictions using microbial populations demonstrates the 259 predictive power of this theoretical framework and its relevance for the control of emerging 260 infectious diseases. 261
Our framework provides important insights regarding emergence and re-emergence in 262
both the presence and absence of pathogen evolution. For instance, this model captures how 263 the composition and diversity of the host population impacts the emergence of a non-evolving 264 pathogen. In this context, a larger proportion of resistant hosts decreases pathogen emer-265 gence, but this effect is weaker in spatially structured populations where transmission is more 266 likely to occur between the same host types, which allows for pathogen persistence in sensitive 267
subpopulations. This effect is akin to the effect of the spatial distribution of suitable habitats on 268 extinction thresholds (20-23) and consistent with earlier work which shows that host composi-269 tion and spatial structure impact the growth rate of bacteriophage 6 (24). In the context of an 270 evolving pathogen, our theory helps to explain the general observation that evolutionary emer-271 gence and the spread of escape mutations is maximal for an intermediate proportion of 272 resistant hosts in the population (25). Specifically, this is because increasing host resistance 273 in the population has two opposite effects: (i) the influx of new mutations decreases because 274 the ancestral pathogen cannot replicate on resistant hosts, (ii) selection for escape mutations 275
increases. 276
Second, our model predicts that diversity in host resistance alleles decreases the prob-277 ability of evolutionary emergence. Even though larger host diversity increases the number of 278 adaptive mutations for the pathogen (i.e. a larger number of targets of selection), each muta-279 tion is associated with a smaller fitness advantage (i.e. a smaller increase in the fraction of the 280 host population that can be infected). The theory presented here therefore helps to explain 281 previous empirical data on the impact of host CRISPR diversity on the evolution of escape 282 phages (17). The link between host biodiversity and infectious diseases has attracted substan-283 tial attention recently (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) . Several studies support the "dilution effect" hypothesis which 284 postulates that host diversity limits disease spread (34-36). For example, host diversity may 285 limit the spread of a pathogen by increasing the fraction of bad quality hosts in the population 286 (36). Indeed, increasing the fraction of resistant hosts (but not the diversity of resistance al-287 leles) decreases the basic reproduction ratio of the wild type pathogen (38, 39) . In addition, 288 host diversity per se may also limit disease spread and several studies have shown the nega-289 tive effect of host diversity on the deterministic growth rate of the pathogen under specific 290 patterns of host-parasite specificity (29, 40, 41) . 291
Notwithstanding these important insights, what sets our theoretical model apart is its 292 ability to predict the factors that impact the initial pathogen emergence, rather than the down-293 stream spread of a pathogen once it has already emerged. Studying this requires stochastic 294 models, which are critical to model the probability of rare events, for example pathogen spillo-295 ver across species, including at the Human-Animal interface (42, 43, 3, 44), the emergence of 296 drug resistance (45, 46), the evolution of vaccine resistance (47) and the reversion of live 297 vaccines (48-52). In all these public-health issues, predicting pathogen emergence requires 298 models accounting for the stochastic nature of epidemiological and evolutionary dynamics. Our 299 work provides a theoretical framework to study these different issues and can thus be used to 300 evaluate the ability of different control strategies to limit pathogen adaptation and emergence. where the amplification of an escape phage is detected) for increasing values of the proportion 454 of resistant bacteria ( ). The different colors correspond to replicate experiments performed 455 using 8 different BIMs (see table S2 and figure S8 ). For each treatment, each of the 96 repli-456 cate host populations was inoculated with an initial quantity of ≈300 unevolved phages. 457
Black lines indicate the mean across the 8 BIMs; grey shaded areas represent 95% confidence 458 intervals of the mean. 459 
